Commercial Remote Sensing and National Security

Dennis Jones

Aerospace helped craft government policy allowing satellite imaging companies to sell their products and services to foreign customers—without compromising national security.

In February 2002, Colombian President Andres Pastrana appeared on his nation's television and declared an end to peace negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, an insurgent group that the government had been fighting for decades. In supporting his decision, Pastrana held up satellite photographs of clandestine road networks developed in the demilitarized zone in the south of Colombia—a violation, he argued, of the two-year-old peace process. The photos he held up for his nation and the world to witness were not declassified images from a Colombian military satellite, nor were they from any U.S. defense system. They were purchased from a U.S. commercial satellite company.

Pastrana's display of commercial satellite imagery received little notice in the media, which was naturally more concerned with his policy announcements. It was, however, one of the most dramatic manifestations of a policy signed by President Clinton in 1994, Presidential Decision Directive-23, U.S. Policy on Foreign Access to U.S. Remote Sensing Capabilities. Aerospace had a role in implementing that policy and later helped shape the directive that would succeed it.

A Landmark Directive

Presidential Decision Directive-23 (or PDD-23, as it is commonly known) had its roots in the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, which established the terms for civil and commercial remote sensing in the U.S. Government. The act designated the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) as the chief regulatory agency for the commercial remote-sensing industry and outlined the general terms and conditions required to obtain a license to operate a remote-sensing satellite in the United States. These included, for example, the submission of on-orbit technical characteristics of the proposed system for NOAA review. The act also stipulated that a licensee "operate the system in such a manner as to preserve the national security of the United States and to observe the international obligations of the United States." These conditions required the government to investigate the ambiguous nexus between technology development and national security and decide on the best course of action. Accordingly, Aerospace began conducting research and analysis to assist the investigation and decision-making process.

This commercial 1-meter resolution satellite image of the Kandahar airfield in Afghanistan was collected on April 23, 2001, by Space Imaging's IKONOS satellite. Military aircraft parked in revetments are visible off the west end of the runway (image is displayed with north up). A commercial aircraft is visible parked near the terminal. (Space Imaging)

PDD-23 was in many ways a response to the end of the Cold War. At that time, major manufacturers of classified satellite systems feared that the elimination of the Soviet Union as an adversary would lead to reduced government spending for national technical architectures. These companies lobbied the administration to permit commercialization of previously classified satellite imaging capabilities as a means to sustain the satellite industrial base and promote U.S. products and services overseas.

The Clinton directive sought to balance the need to protect sensitive technology from proliferating while advancing the fortunes of U.S. companies that desired to enter this new market. The policy tilted, albeit slightly, toward national security by including provisions for the suspension of commercial operations by the Secretary of Commerce (in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State) when U.S. troops were at risk or when the nation faced a clear and present danger. The Clinton policy included general guidelines for licensing commercial capabilities, supporting the goal of maintaining the U.S. industry's lead over international competitors. The policy refrained from articulating a clear set of operating capabilities, leaving it to the interagency process to make licensing determinations on a case-by-case basis.

Aerospace would come to play a major role in facilitating this interagency process. When the government asked for assistance in interpreting and implementing PDD-23, Aerospace supported the drafting of a new remote-sensing policy for the Director of Central Intelligence and assisted in the creation and implementation of the CIA's Remote Sensing Committee, chaired by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (formerly the National Imaging and Mapping Agency, or NIMA). Aerospace also assisted the NRO in fulfilling its role as the licensing coordinator for the intelligence community and oversaw Department of Defense (DOD) implementation actions, shepherding numerous licensing and export control issues through the DOD clearance process. In addition, Aerospace analyzed thousands of space technology export license requests and dozens of commercial operating license actions and provided timely, in-depth analysis of foreign remote-sensing capabilities to ensure the balance between commercial competitiveness and national security protection was maintained.

A New Directive

The Clinton policy was a watershed for the remote-sensing community. It allowed U.S. companies to build, launch, and operate high-resolution satellites with frequent-revisit, high-data-rate collection and, in some cases, regional tasking, downlinking, and nearly instantaneous processing. The policy heralded a new era in which almost any consumer with available resources—from governments to private citizens—could purchase high-resolution images of almost any point on Earth.

This commercial 1-meter resolution satellite image of the Kandahar airfield in Afghanistan was collected on Oct. 10, 2001, by Space Imaging's IKONOS satellite. The damage visible to the airfield's runway, taxiway and revetments is evidence of the precision delivery of the coalition ordnance. There is no visual evidence of damage to noncritical areas. Ordnance impacts are especially evident when compared to a "before" image of the same airfield taken by the IKONOS satellite on April 23, 2001. The Kandahar airfield is located southeast of the city of Kandahar. IKONOS travels 680 kilometers above Earth's surface at a speed of more than 28,000 kilometers per hour. It's the world's first commercial high-resolution remote sensing satellite. Image is displayed with north up. (Space Imaging)

Still, the commercial market for such imagery—both domestic and international—did not materialize as rapidly or as broadly as anticipated. Pastrana's display highlighted both the promise and frustrations of the burgeoning industry: The images and their derived products had immediate applications, but the widespread adoption by repeat or large-volume customers was slow to develop. Thus, the sustainability of the commercial satellite imaging industry still was less than certain nearly a decade after its inception.

The Bush administration sought to change that with the approval of a new National Security Presidential Directive on U.S. commercial remote sensing in April 2003. This policy provided a strong government rationale for procuring high-resolution imagery from U.S. providers, established a framework for international access to high-resolution remote-sensing technology, encouraged civil departments and agencies to integrate high-resolution data into daily operations, and more clearly delineated U.S. Government roles and responsibilities regarding the commercial industry. This was the president's first major policy directive under the auspices of a comprehensive National Security Council review of space policy matters. Aerospace played a key role in supporting the DOD, NRO, and intelligence community in assisting the National Security Council in the drafting, coordination, and eventual approval of the new directive.

The Bush administration's policy, like that of the Clinton administration, sought both to advance and protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests "through maintaining the nation's leadership in remote sensing space capabilities." However, the Bush directive went further by suggesting that "sustaining and enhancing the U.S. remote sensing industry" would also help achieve that goal. In other words, a strong U.S. commercial remote-sensing industry could be good for business and good for national security.

The Bush administration's policy also offered a more aggressive U.S. Government approach to commercial remote sensing by defining what role commercial imagery would play in satisfying government requirements. The most fundamental shift was in mandating that the government "rely to the maximum practical extent on U.S. commercial remote sensing space capabilities for filling imagery and geo-spatial needs for military, intelligence, foreign policy, homeland security, and civil users" (see sidebar, The Government Role).

Satellite image showing where Saddam Hussein was captured at Ad Dawr in Iraq. The location of the inset is in the upper left hand corner of the larger image. (Space Imaging)

With that role for commercial imagery delineated, the policy established how the government would realign its own imagery collection efforts to meet national needs—for example, by focusing on more challenging intelligence and defense requirements and advanced technology solutions. PDD-23 never specified a defined mission for U.S. commercial imagery. Interestingly, the Clinton directive contained no references to "geo-spatial" needs at all. The world of commercial remote sensing and the U.S. Government's adoption of it as a critical source of information had clearly evolved.

Aerospace personnel supported the development of the Bush administration's National Security Presidential Directive from its inception through approval, including interagency debate and coordination. Even now, Aerospace personnel are assisting in the policy's implementation. The same Aerospace offices that helped implement PDD-23 were tapped once again for their understanding of that directive as well as for their insight into foreign governmental and commercial technology developments in the remote-sensing marketplace. The Aerospace policy cadre assisted the government in ensuring that the new policy was cognizant of all aspects of commercial remote-sensing policy history and lessons learned. Aerospace personnel also ensured that policy makers possessed a strong appreciation for the technical aspects and national security and commercial implications of the new remote-sensing policy.

Aerospace is leading a major effort to develop the Sensitive Technologies List, which will provide the State Department, in its lead role for export control, with comprehensive information about space technologies and serve as a guide for deciding export licenses for space systems, components, and technologies. Aerospace continues to support the government in the negotiation and implementation of government- to-government agreements and other international frameworks concerning the transfer of sensitive space technology. The Aerospace team also supports U.S. delegations in their consultations with foreign allies on the adoption of effective national policies and regulatory regimes to manage the operation and possible proliferation of space technology.

Satellite image of the area where the U.S. forces struck on the first night of the Iraq war (Dora Farm), believed to be Saddam Hussein's bunker that night. (Space Imaging)

Aerospace helped the NRO and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency develop a strategy in 1999 that would integrate commercial imagery into current and future architectures. In 2001, Aerospace again assisted with further policy research and technical analysis to support an update of the strategy; both versions called for significant top-line funding increases for commercial imagery purchases, integration, and readiness. These efforts culminated in the ClearView and NextView programs. Under the ClearView program, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency agreed to purchase a minimum level of imagery data over a five-year period; several contracts have been awarded for satellite imagery with nominal ground sampling distances of one meter or less. NextView moves beyond the commodity-based approach of commercial imagery acquisition and seeks to ensure access, priority tasking rights, area coverage, and broad licensing for sharing imagery with all potential mission partners. Initial contracts will provide ground sampling distance down to half a meter.

Conclusion

Developments in commercial remote sensing have required Aerospace to adapt its traditional strengths to assist the U.S. Government in crafting and implementing sound policy for the benefit of the national security and commercial space communities. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, for example, has asked Aerospace to help its Commercial Imagery Center manage the NextView program and provide advice and guidance in the creation of a branch office to manage commercial imagery policy, plans, and strategy. Through these and other efforts, Aerospace will continue to help U.S. defense intelligence agencies define, communicate, and fulfill their critical geospatial imaging needs.

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