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Foresight and Commitment: 45 Years of Aerospace
Joe M. Straus
Aerospace has been involved in virtually every national security space mission since the beginning of the space era and remains a major partner in developing the nation's next generation of launch vehicles and satellite programs.
During the past five years, national security space programs have experienced an unprecedented level of recapitalization and improvement, revolutionizing the nation's ability to conduct military operations. Aerospace, as a critical resource for national security space, has both influenced these changes and been influenced by them. However, the trends now taking place in national security space in general, and at Aerospace in particular, actually have their roots in the mid 1990s. (See Timeline, part 1, and Timeline, part 2).
More for Less?
The military acquisition reforms of the 1990s were prompted by the end of the Cold War. Procurement budgets were cut drastically to reflect the nation's shift in defense priorities. At the same time, commercial space was preparing for rapid expansion, anticipating large constellations of telecommunication satellites and a need for massive launch capability.
These two trends led to what is now recognized as wishful thinking. Believing that more could be done for less, both government and industry made certain assumptions about how space systems, including launch systems, could be acquired. The government believed it could cut costs by shifting much of its role to the commercial sector. The theory was that these profit-driven systems-integration and technology companies could develop complex space systems efficiently and economically, with little government oversight, thereby saving the government billions of dollars. In essence, the government would assume more risk to reduce cost, but would manage that risk.
The intent was noble, but the execution was flawed. Five launch failures occurred in 1998 and 1999, including two commercial ventures and three national security missions. In each case, hundreds or thousands of people did everything that was expected of them; and yet something—be it a nicked wire or an erroneous software constant—slipped by unnoticed. Assets of roughly $10 billion were lost, along with the critical functionality that the military, civil, and commercial communities were expecting from the satellites.
Raising the Bar
In response to these failures, the government sponsored a Broad Area Review (BAR), which made a number of recommendations for launch program recovery. The most significant recommendation was that mission success, rather than cost and schedule, should be paramount. The BAR report noted that billions of dollars worth of national space assets were riding on inherently risky vehicles, and that a focus on budget could at best achieve only a minimal reduction in cost, but with a substantial increase in risk. The BAR report also emphasized that systems engineering needed more discipline, along with greater government oversight and formal risk management. Finally, the report noted that thorough postflight analysis was needed, even on successful launches.
In 2001, the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization also recommended a number of changes in the organizational structure of national security space. As a result, the Air Force and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) space programs were assigned to the Undersecretary of the Air Force, who took on the additional roles of Director of the NRO and Air Force Acquisition Executive for Space; the Air Force Space Command was raised to a four-star billet; the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) was transferred from Air Force Materiel Command to Air Force Space Command; and the role of Program Executive Officer for Space was assigned to the Commander of SMC.
Since implementation of the BAR recommendations, there have been 40 consecutive successful operational national security space launches. Nonetheless, acquisition problems remain. For example, cost overruns on the Space-Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS) and the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) programs recently prompted a study on overall national security space acquisition and how it could be improved. That study, which included top-level Aerospace support, was conducted in 2003 and revisited in 2004 by a joint team of the Defense Science Board and the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. It cited five contributors to acquisition difficulties.
First, cost had replaced mission success as the primary driver in managing space development programs. For SBIRS and FIA, this emphasis on cost resulted from the budget squeeze of the 1990s, when the programs were initiated.
Joe M. Straus became Executive Vice President of The Aerospace Corporation in October 2001. He joined the company in 1973 as a member of the technical staff in the Space Sciences Laboratory. During his distinguished career at Aerospace, he has served as Director of the Chemistry and Physics Laboratory; Principal Director of the Communications Systems Subdivision; General Manager of the Electronic Systems Division; General Manager of the Space-Based Surveillance Division; Senior Vice president of Space Program Operations, Space Systems Group; and Senior Vice President of Strategic Planning. He holds a B.A. in physics from Rice University and a Ph.D. in earth and space sciences from UCLA. |
Second, unrealistic estimates led to unrealistic budgets and to programs that could not be successfully executed as designed. Cost estimates were typically minimized during the advocacy phase to fit constrained budgets.
Third, undisciplined definition and uncontrolled growth in system requirements increased cost and caused schedule delays. The space acquisition system lacked disciplined processes to control requirements. Trade-offs among cost, schedule, and risk were generally not supported by rigorous systems engineering, budget, and program management processes.
Fourth, the government's ability to lead and manage the space acquisition process had seriously eroded. The acquisition reforms of the 1990s had marginalized the roles of government agencies and federally funded research and development centers, such as Aerospace. At the same time, program managers lost authority to execute effectively. The government experience base in program management and systems engineering eroded, which substantially damaged its ability to be a smart buyer.
Last, industry had failed to implement proven management and engineering practices on some programs.
The observations and recommendations of the team have led to a renewed emphasis on systems engineering and a focus on mission success. Aerospace has been deeply involved in these efforts. For example, Aerospace contributed to the 2004 Mission Assurance Improvement Task Force, which was sponsored by the SMC Chief Engineer and the NRO Deputy Director for Systems Engineering. The recommendations of this task force have already yielded improvements in software processes; systems engineering practices; test effectiveness and verification; parts, materials, and processes; and specifications and standards. In fact, the task force has been instrumental in revising and reinstituting military specifications and standards that apply to space programs.
With the shift away from the tenets of acquisition reform, Aerospace has taken on a new level of corporate accountability for mission success, for program executability, and for timely identification of problems and corrective action. These accountabilities complement Aerospace's traditional roles in providing objective technical recommendations based on sound analysis and expertise and serving as a technical archive to document and share lessons learned across the national security space community.
The Road Ahead
Today, three factors predominate the government's strategy for space acquisition. The first is the fact that warfare and intelligence organizations designed for the relatively stable Cold War period are not fast enough or adaptable enough to fight organized terrorism, which poses threats rapidly over large areas of Earth without regard for national boundaries. The second is the growing realization that space systems provide a vital capability—that is, global information collection and dissemination—needed for national security in this new environment. The third is the recognition that existing military and intelligence services can be made more effective by giving more information to more people, when and where they need it. The goal is to predict the actions of adversaries and to move faster and more effectively than they do. Space systems are one critical component of this new capability, and within the last five years, the government has set out to recapitalize and improve every space mission area. As a result, virtually every current satellite and launch system will be replaced with a new generation—and in some cases, even the new generation will be replaced by a "transformational system" that is already being planned.
For example, in the area of wideband military satellite communications, the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) is being replaced by the Wideband Gapfiller program, which is nearing completion of its first spacecraft. A single Wideband Gapfiller spacecraft will have the capacity of the entire DSCS constellation. The last DSCS III spacecraft entered service in December 2003, joining 11 other DSCS satellites operating at that time. Aerospace was instrumental in helping to raise the throughput of the constellation during Operation Iraqi Freedom by 15 percent using special operational procedures. By some estimates, 60 percent of all communications traffic at the height of the war went through satellites, which underscores the importance of maximizing the use of existing communication satellites.
Secure military communications programs are undergoing similar changes. Four orbiting Milstar satellites achieved the desired network connectivity in January 2002 after substantially more than a decade of development. The successful launch of the final Milstar spacecraft was particularly important because an earlier Milstar spacecraft had been lost due to a malfunction of the launch vehicle's upper stage. Aerospace was instrumental in ensuring that this final spacecraft reached orbit safely in April 2003 after evaluating a number of issues, including the possibility of "pogo" oscillations, which can destroy or damage the spacecraft during ascent. Milstar will give way to the Advanced EHF program, which is now in the manufacturing stage and which will begin launching spacecraft in the next few years. Close behind that is the Transformational Communications program, which was started officially in December 2001. This program will use laser communications to vastly increase bandwidth and data rate and improve information sharing through better connectivity with ground networks. Aerospace is involved in all these new beginnings, while attending to the needs of the legacy programs.
In the missile warning area, the venerable Defense Support Program (DSP) is being replaced by SBIRS, whose mission has expanded to include missile defense, technical intelligence, and battle-space characterization. The penultimate DSP launch in February 2004 marked the last Air Force launch on a Titan IV and the last launch of the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS). The last DSP spacecraft will launch in late 2005 aboard the heavy-lift variant of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). This will be the first operational launch of the EELV Heavy, and it will carry one of the oldest spacecraft in the inventory. Aerospace developed operational methods to increase the life of the existing DSP constellation by two years to help with the transition to the new SBIRS program, which will not begin launching for several years to come. Aerospace has also been involved in developing the new ground systems for SBIRS, which are far more complex than previous DSP ground systems.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is also transitioning to a new era of enhanced capabilities. Many of the original GPS satellites have lasted long beyond their expected lifetime. These are now being replaced by the GPS IIR spacecraft. The 52nd GPS spacecraft was launched in November 2004 and brought the number of operational satellites to 30, the largest GPS constellation ever. The new GPS IIF follow-on program is in the manufacturing phase and will begin launching in 2007. Following that will be GPS III, which is currently in the requirements definition phase. Aerospace has been deeply involved in the system engineering and evolution of this complex program and has developed the replenishment strategy currently being used by the government. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Aerospace devised operational methods to improve the accuracy of GPS signals in Iraq by 15 percent. GPS III will present an entirely updated system while maintaining legacy capabilities for all users.
The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) will be replaced around 2010 by the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), which was moved from Air Force management to NOAA. In October 2003, a DMSP satellite was launched on the last Titan II. This was the 13th Titan II in the series, which had a 100 percent success rate.
Many other important programs are also getting started or upgraded, including most of the classified NRO programs. The Space Radar program, which is now in a requirements definition phase, will offer new military and reconnaissance capabilities. The Space Tracking and Surveillance System will provide space-based support to the missile defense system. The Space-Based Space Surveillance system, scheduled for launch in 2007, will provide better situational awareness and will detect and track orbiting space objects.
In the launch area, many of the legacy Atlas, Titan II, and upper stage vehicles have been launched for the last time, or soon will be. The two remaining Titan IV vehicles are scheduled for launch in 2005, ending the era of the Titan space launch program. These vehicles will be replaced by the new EELV launch vehicles, Delta IV and Atlas V, which have each carried out four missions.
Conclusion
With so many programs in transition, the national security space community will be challenged to find the proper mix of oversight, discipline, enthusiasm, and realism to ensure consistent mission success. But Aerospace can look back on its 45 years of history to know that mission success in space programs clearly requires an uncompromising focus on quality. And looking forward to the next five (or 45) years, Aerospace will work to ensure that its government customers never lose that focus.
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